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Abstract 
 
When the price of a food crop changes, the short term welfare variations of rural households is 
approximated thanks to the Net Benefit Ratio (NBR) defined by Deaton (1989). The NBR 
expression relies on a typology distinguishing between net sellers, net buyers and self sufficient 
households. We show that the typology’s criteria and the classic formula of NBR use i) produced 
and consumed quantities rather than real marketed volumes and ii) a unique price for selling and 
buying for all surveyed households. In this paper, we propose another definition of a net seller and a 
new NBR expression that allow to take into account market failures (MF) and price seasonality (PS), 
which are two very common features in developing countries. We used two sets of data (from 
Mexico and Mali), and found that, if considering MF and PS, (1) the household typology can be 
partly reconfigured and (2) the distribution of the NBR over the household income profile slightly 
changes.  
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1) Introduction 
Distributional impacts assessment of trade liberalization policies are a great concern for 
development economists. This kind of distributional analysis can be implemented ex ante or ex post 
for any type of household (rural, urban, high skilled, etc.) in any case of reform affecting the prices 
of factors (chemical inputs, land, labour) or goods (produced or consumed ones) such as food crop 
(Porto (2004). Since fight against poverty is a major goal and since an important proportion of the 
poor in developing countries live in rural area (Bardhan (2006), agricultural households are the 
centre of the attention. A common feature of agricultural households in developing countries is that, 
facing missing or failing markets, such as food or labour markets, they consume all or most of what 
they produce. Examples of both produced and consumed crops are millet and sorghum in Africa, 
maize and beans in Latin America, rice in Asia etc. In a quite adverse economic environment, 
relying on markets to get its own food is risky, so poor agricultural household first seek to satisfy 
their basic needs by producing their own food (Fafchamps, 1992). They do not buy all of their food 
needs nor sell all their production. If production exceeds consumption and market price worth it, 
they sell the surplus. 
How are those agricultural households affected by a price variation of a good they both produce 
and consume? A first answer would be this one: let’s imagine that the effect of trade reform is a 
sharp decrease in the price of maize in Mexico, households who sell maize are loosing while those 
who buy it are clearly favoured by the reform. But, since most of agricultural households both 
produce and consume maize (in this example), how do we know if they are loosing or wining from 
the price decrease? In economic literature on impact analysis of a food crop price change, part of 
the solution relies on a typology that cuts out inside the agricultural households’ continuum, 
defining three types: the net buyer, the net seller and the self sufficient households (Sadoulet et de 
Janvry (1995)). Given this statement, it is well-known that a net buyer (resp. seller) will gain (resp. 
loose) from a price decrease while a self sufficient household will not be affected by the price 
change since it is isolated from the market (it is insensible to price variations because it doesn’t sell 
nor buy) (Hoekman and al. (2001); McCulloch, Winters and Cirera (2001) ; de Janvry (2004))2. 
When the reform’s effect is a price decrease, the more net buyers there are, the better effects the 
reform will have.  
So a crucial feature of economic analysis of agricultural households is to determine whether a 
household is a net buyer, a net seller or self-sufficient (Sadoulet and de Janvry, 1995). In this paper 
we discuss the definition of those concepts, analysing the criteria employed to classify an 
agricultural household in one of those three types. We first show that the most common way in 
literature is to compare for every household its produced and consumed quantities over the survey 
period. The Net Benefit Ratio (NBR), a crucial concept developed by Deaton (1989) for non 
parametric analysis of short term distributional impacts of a price variation, also relies on these 
criteria (see Deaton (1997)). Chabe-Ferret (2005) showed that this common expression of the NBR 
(derived from the separable farm household model, see Annexe) is flawed in a multi output context 
(intermediary uses of the crop, sharecropping fees), and proved that the NBR can be adapted to the 
possible non separable household. In this paper, we criticize the classic NBR formula because, by 
using a unique price, it implicitly neglects possible food crop price seasonality. We propose a more 
flexible expression for the NBR which allows taking into account every market transactions and 
agricultural price seasonality and we compare both criteria using data of two household surveys 
from Mexico and Mali.  
 
2) The “quantity definition” 
2.1) The classic definition of a net seller and the NBR expression 
Let’s consider an agricultural household h, producing crop i, among others. During one year, 
we note Q its production and X its consumption of crop i. The most common definition of a net 
                                                 
2 Dyer and al. (2005) showed it is not that simple: for example, a maize self-sufficient agricultural household can be 
affected by a price variation of maize if it rents land or sells labour to local big producers of maize (price of land or 
labour are linked to the price of maize). 
 3
seller (resp. net buyer ; self sufficient) agricultural household regarding crop i, is this one (for more 
simple notations we give up indice i): 
Qh < Xh  ⇔ h is a net buyer 
Qh > Xh ⇔  h is a net seller 
Qh = Xh ⇔ h is self-sufficient 
Box 1: The “quantity definition” of a net buyer, net seller and self-sufficient agricultural household 
 
We call it the “quantity definition” because it is based on the produced and consumed 
quantities. First of all, let’s notice the semantic ambiguity of this definition: to be a seller or a buyer 
supposes a link with the market. Yet, the way to distinguish a net seller from a net buyer in Box 1 is 
based on quantities that are, at this stage, independent of marketed quantities. In our opinion, 
produced and consumed quantities would only allow to distinguish a net producer from a net 
consumer (but not a net seller from a net buyer). Although ambiguous, this definition is used very 
frequently (de Janvry, Sadoulet and Gordillo (1995), Robilliard (1998), Barrett and Dorosh (1996), 
Henning and Henningsen (2005), Ravallion (1989), Phelinas (1986), Hoyos (2005), Chabe-Ferret 
(2004, 2005)) or recommended (Deaton (1995, 1997), Hoekman and alli. (2001, p. 70)).  
To evaluate the distributional effects of a variation of crop i’s price, Deaton (1989) 
developed the concept of Net Benefit Ratio (NBR), which represents the budget share of crop i for 
each household h (it can also be interpreted as the elasticity of income with the price of good i) . It 
is written: 
h
ii
iih C
XQpNBR −=  ,                                                                          (0) 
where Ch is total expenditure of household h, and pi is the price of crop i. Budd (1993) clearly 
stated the importance of the NBR: “The manner in which this ratio varies across the income 
distribution illuminates how a price change affects income across the income distribution “. As a 
matter of fact, the NBR variation (  for household h is proportional and takes the opposite 
sign of the income equivalent transfer to realize to household h to compensate its welfare change 
caused by the price variation of i ( (see Annexe). We easily verify it: suppose pi increased 
( and h produces more than it consumes (Q
)ihNBRΔ
)piΔ
)0>Δpi i – Xi > 0), then h’s welfare is increasing 
because of the price variation. NBRih > 0, which means that the equivalent income transfer must be 
negative to re-establish his initial utility level. Here, let’s just remark that this NBR expression also 
relies on the produced and consumed quantities as well as it is to define a net seller (resp. buyer) in 
Box 1. The marketed surplus, which is said to be proportional to the household welfare change, is 
inferred from the collected data of produced and the consumed quantities during the survey. 
 
2.2) The links with real marketed quantities 
Definitions in Box 1 assume that Q – X is the marketed quantity (bought or sold depending 
on the sign), valued at the unique price pi in the NBR expression (0). By taking those definitions 
and expressions you suppose that h is facing perfect market for commodity i. In this perfect market 
framework, we note Qb the total bought quantity of i, Qs the total sold quantity of i, B the total value 
of purchases of i and S the total value of sales of i, by household h. It is possible to write: 
Q < X ⇔     [ 
 
X  ≥ Qb ≥ X – Q        and     Qb > Qs ≥ 0 
 
] (1) 
Q > X ⇔ [ 
 
0 ≤ Qb ≤ X        and        0 ≤ Qb < Qs ≤ Q 
 
] (2) 
Q = X ⇔ [ 
 
Q ≥ Qb = Qs ≥ 0 
 
] (3) 
Box 2: Possible relations between produced, consumed and marketed quantities if assuming a 
perfect market 
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But in fact, when using the NBR expression (0), you implicitly consider that (1) means Qb = X – Q 
and Qs = 0, that (2) means Qs = Q – X and Qb = 0 and that (3) means Qb = Qs = 0 (you take 
convenient values in the possibility interval). In a nutshell, three critics can be done to the “quantity 
definition” and this associated NBR expression (0): 
1. It contains a semantic ambiguity. It only considers the marketed quantities indirectly, inferring 
them from the produced and consumed quantities by household h. Yet welfare impacts are 
channelled through the effective marketed quantities. 
2. By considering a unique price pi, it implicitly supposes a perfect market for household h and 
crop i, and we know how far this assumption can be from developing countries’ rural areas. 
3. Finally, by taking into account a unique price in the NBR expression, it also neglects the 
possibility of price seasonality (two different sales can be done at two different prices by the 
same household). 
 
3) Market failure and price seasonality: a proposition of a “value definition” 
3.1) Allowing for a difference between the buying and the selling price of the food crop 
Though using the “quantity definition”, Ravallion (1989) recognizes that: “all households 
face the same prices, which do not vary according to whether one buys or sells the commodity in 
question. The realism of […] these assumptions can be questioned”. Some authors have taken into 
account market failure by considering that households have to face a “price band”, which means 
that bought and sold quantities are exchanged at different prices on the market (Minot and Goletti 
(1998); Benoit-Cattin (1994); Omamo (1998); Nicita (2004)). Minot and Goletti, for instance, use 
data from a household survey in Vietnam to estimate the possible effects on farmers’ welfare of a 
liberalization of rice exports. They calculate the transmission to regional prices (selling (Ps) and 
buying prices (Pb)) induced by a change in the border price. So they clearly consider the possibility 
of market failures for Vietnamese rice producers. Minot and Goletti utilized a slightly different 
NBR (compared to (0)): first of all they made up a second order (long term) effects (but we do not 
consider it here after since we concentrate on first order effects assessments) and, second, they took 
into account market failures by allowing, for each region, two different prices for households’ 
bought and sold quantities. Unfortunately, they calculated the regional buying and selling prices, 
but they do not apply them to each household’s real bought and sold quantities but to marketed 
quantities derived from Q and X, assuming the relations in Box 3. 
Box 3: Possible relations between produced, consumed and marketed quantities if assuming market 
failures 
If Q < X then B = Pb * (X – Q) > 0 and Qs = S = 0 ⇔ h can only be a buyer, it never 
sells i (4) 
If Q > X then B = Qb = 0 and S = Ps * (Q – X) > 0 ⇔ h can only be a seller, it never 
buys i (5) 
If Q = X then B = Qb = 0 = S = Qs                          ⇔ h never buys nor sells i (6) 
 
So the first order part of their NBR can be written as: 
)(1 ∑∑ −=
b
bb
s
ss
h
ih QPQPC
NBR  (7) 
Two critics can be done to this approach: 
- as de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet (1991) mentioned, “market failure is not commodity 
specific but household specific”: although differentiating selling and buying prices (Ps < Pb), and 
allowing them to take regional values, the prices Minot and Goletti used are the same for all 
households living in a same region.  
- Second point is that (Qb, Qs) are hypothetical because they are derived from Q and X (as it was 
in the perfect market framework).  In Fig. 1, we represent those assumed relations between Q, X, 
Qb and Qs in both frameworks (perfect or imperfect markets). 
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Fig1: Assumed relations between Q, X, Qb and Qs
 
These assumed relations are the same in both frameworks but their justifications differs. In 
the perfect market framework, those relations are justified by the fact that only one price is used in 
the NBR expression, so Q – X > 0 implies that Qs = Q – X and Qb = 0 (it will not have 
consequences on the NBR calculation). If considering two prices for sold and bought marketed 
quantities, those relations are justified by the fact that Pb > Ps (the retail price is always greater than 
the farm gate price), so farmers prefer their own maize which is cheaper than buying it on the 
market (see Jayne (1994)).  
Let us introduce another definition of a net seller (resp. buyer; resp. self-sufficient) 
agricultural household, based on total value of real marketed declared quantities during the survey 
period (and not on produced and consumed quantities). We call it the “value definition”: 
BBh < Sh ⇔ h is a net seller 
BBh > Sh  ⇔ h is a net buyer 
BBh = Sh ⇔ h is self-sufficient 
Box 4: The “value definition” of a net buyer, a net seller and a self-sufficient agricultural household 
 
3.2) Allowing for price seasonality  
The more flexible and the more adapted to developing countries realities, the better the NBR 
will be to represent farmers’ welfare variations. So, including a possibility for two different prices 
for sales and purchases makes the expression (7) better than the (0). But (7) still does not enable to 
consider price seasonality, which is another constancy in rural area in developing countries (Sahn, 
1989), along with market failures. Price seasonality only means that prices on local markets depend 
on the period of the year: ][
][ decemberjanuaryttPP
decemberjanuaryttPP
ss
bb
...),(
...),(
∈=
∈=
 
Let’s imagine a farmer which produces 2 tons of maize per year and his family needs are 1,5 
tons. He is classified as a net seller according to the “quantity definition”. Supposed that, pressed by 
cash requirements, he had to sell 1,5 tons so he could only keep 0,5 ton for his own consumption. 
He sold 1,5 tons at market price of 100$/ton and then obtained 150$. But, when what he kept to 
feed his family is over, he has to buy 1 ton. He is poor and can only buy small quantities because he 
does not have enough money to buy 1 ton in one purchase (revealing a credit constraint which is 
also a common feature of rural households in developing countries). Suppose he buys this ton in 5 
purchases (200 kg each times) during post harvest period while prices are going up. For each 
purchase market prices are 130, 160, 200, 230 and 250 ($/ton). So total expenditure to buy maize 
are 194$ > 150 $: he is a net seller according to the “value definition”. If, during the survey, 
interviewer only asks for Q and X, the economist will conclude that this household would benefit 
from a price increase, whereas he would not. 
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The new definition of a net seller we propose here is thus relying on the same idea than in 
Box4: monetary values of marketed quantities are more important than produced and consumed 
quantities to classify a net seller. Moreover, we define Bh and Sh differently by allowing every 
market transactions t of household h to be described (traded volumes and related market prices). 
Subscript t characterizes the transaction but also generally symbolizes time showing that we now 
can consider price seasonality, each household is possibly facing: 
∑
∑
=
=
t
ss
t
bb
tQtPS
tQtPB
)()(
)()(
 
(8) 
 
(9) 
 
Consequently, we propose a new NBR formula for household h and good i: 
])()()()([1 ∑∑ −=
t
aa
t
vv
h
i tQtPtQtPC
NBR  (10)
Are biases of household’s classification frequent? Does the use of one or another expression of 
NBR have any consequences on the results of a distributional analysis? This is what we will study 
in the next part of this paper, using data of Mexican and Malian agricultural households. 
 
4) The data 
We use two data base of agricultural households: the first one was constituted by the author and 
Bouthier (2006) between april 2006 and july 2007, in the Municipio of Teopisca (Chiapas, Mexico) 
and concerns 215 small to medium maize growers; the second was buld by IER (Institut 
d’Economie Rurale) and CIRAD (Centre de Coopération International en Recherche Agronomique 
pour le Développement) in 2004 in the region of the “Office de la Haute Vallée du Niger”, and was 
related to the program “Politiques agricoles et Développement Régional” (ECODIS). Two 
geographic zones have been surveyed: the cotton zone and the rice zone; total number of surveyed 
households was around 400. This survey was quite focused on cotton and rice production as cash 
crops but all food crops’ data had been recorded. After eliminating absurd data, we have 166 maize 
producers, 158 sorghum producers and 161 millet producers3. To know more about the farmers of 
this region, see Bélières et al. (2002; 2005), Coulibaly et  al. (2006), Djouara et al. (2006). 
 
5) Results 
5.1) Time, price seasonality and aggregated traded quantities 
5.1.1) In Chiapas, Mexico 
Mexican agricultural households can sell at farm gate to a local independent trader called 
“coyote” at price Ps or travel to the certified silo to sell at price Ps’ > Ps. Consumption unit of the 
household can buy maize on the village market at retail price Pb ≥ Ps’ (Fig.2).  
 
Production Unit
Consumption Unit
Agricultural
Household
Traders
Coyotes
Ps
Pb
Selling
Market
Buying
Market
Certified
silo
Ps ’
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig2: Relations between household and market (source: author) 
In the Municipio of Teopisca (Chiapas), the first harvests of rain fed maize (the most 
abundant maize) begin in December and finish at the end of January. Climate and access to 
irrigation only allow the major part of peasants to cultivate only one crop per year, but some of 
                                                 
3 Agricultural households produce several crops but their classification as a net seller, buyer, and self-sufficient is 
relative to one crop only. 
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them can irrigate and sow maize in January / February to harvest in july / august (Bouthier, 2006). 
In situ observations and field work show that it exists a difference between the selling (to the coyote) 
and buying (smaller quantities on the local retail market) prices across agricultural households. Fig. 
3 shows the average (over all the recorded transactions of all households) monthly selling and 
buying prices.  
 
Maize Prices, Teopisca, Chiapas (2006)
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
ja
nu
ar
y
fe
br
ua
ry
m
ar
ch
ap
ril
m
ay
ju
ne ju
ly
au
gu
st
se
pt
em
be
r
oc
to
be
r
no
ve
m
be
r
de
ce
m
be
r
pe
so
s 
/ t
on
Retail market buying price Farmer selling price
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig3: Seasonality of Price of Maize in Teopisca, Chiapas, Mexico (source: author) 
 
This difference is observable and does not correspond to the unobservable transactions costs 
that are household specific. The gap varies across the months and can be important in both absolute 
and relative terms. Sales to the Coyote are done at a price varying between 1500 and 2200 pesos / t, 
while purchases on the market (to retailers which can be the same Coyotes) are associated with 
prices varying between 1500 and 3600 pesos / t. From November to February, the certified silo is 
open and it is possible to sell at 1500 pesos / t. During this period, the retail price of maize on the 
market is close to its sale price, because maize is locally abundant. After February, it is only 
possible to sell or buy to the Coyotes and no more to the silo which is closed. No other maize has 
been harvested in the neighbouring regions. Then, storage loss, transport costs, capital 
immobilization, labour time, are remunerated and both selling and buying maize price increase (see 
Ninin-Massenet and Ribier, 1998). Observable price band amplitude reaches a maximum in July: 
retail price of maize is equal to 163% the farm gate selling price. In August and September, 
irrigated maize is harvested and prices begin to decrease. 
For each Mexican agricultural household we surveyed, we asked for annual maize 
production, consumption and marketed volumes (sold and bought), but unfortunately we do not 
have the date of each market transaction so we can not represent the aggregated trade dynamic. 
Although we have recorded prices of each transaction we can not find the corresponding date using 
Fig. 3, since to one price it is possible to match two different dates (there is no bijection). 
 
5.1.2) In Mali 
Here we can build the intra annual dynamic of traded volumes (Fig. 4). The first point we 
want to emphasize is price seasonality. For all the three crops we observe, as in the case of Teopisca 
(Chiapas, Mexico), the monthly average of households’ buying and selling prices vary across the 
year. Next point is that buying price (retail price) is always higher than farmer’s selling price 
(except for millet in July and August). This price band is represents the fact that there are non 
household specific market failures in the region. Lastly, let’s notice that this price differential 
strongly decreases during harvest period (July, August, September).  
Second range of observations concerns the aggregated marketed volumes of cereals. For all 
the three crops, aggregated sales are much more concentrated in the time than are aggregated 
purchases. Much part of the sales are occurring right after the harvest, we suppose it is so to be able 
to repay the inputs related credit(s). Those sales are made at a relatively low price, if compared to 
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the maximum selling price during the year. For maize and millet, an important part of aggregated 
purchases are made just before harvest at relatively high prices. 
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Fig4: Intra annual dynamic of aggregated marketed quantities of three crops in Mali.  
Harvest months are from July to September. (Unknown = undated traded quantities) 
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Those graphics show that farmers are far from selling at the highest price and buying at the 
cheapest one. This very well-known fact has already been studied and is often related to their cash 
and storage constraints (see Ellsworth and Shapiro (1989)). Moreover, Attanasio and Frayne (2006) 
showed that the poor pay more in general for the same product because they buy smaller quantities 
at retail (and higher) prices.  
The data show in both cases the existence of market failures and price seasonality. So in 
order to analyze effective marketed quantities by rural households, it is important to take into 
account two different prices for each commodity: it is the obvious sign of market failure which is a 
very common feature in developing countries’ rural areas. Depending on its intensity (evolution of 
the ratio Ps (t) / Pb (t); Ps (t) / Ps (t=0) and Pb (t) / Pb (t=0) over time), it would also be convenient to 
consider price seasonality both in the definition of a net seller (resp. buyer; resp. self-sufficient) and 
in the expression of the NBR formula which is used to assess welfare effects of price changes. In a 
nutshell, it is important to record precisely every transaction of each household. 
 
5.2) Comparing the quantity and value definitions 
Here we compare the “quantity definition” of Box 1 to the “value definition” of Box 4. B 
and S were calculated by the author with relations (8) and (9). Table 1 presents the number and 
proportion of each household type (net buyer, net seller and self-sufficient) in both countries and for 
four food crops.  
   Quantity Definition Value Definition  
   N % N % 
Net Buyer 49 22,8 60 27,9 
Net Seller 163 75,8 152 70,6 
Mexique 
(Teopisca, 
Chiapas) 
Maize  
[215] 
Self-sufficient 3 1,5 3 1,5 
Net Buyer 35 21,1 39 23,4 
Net Seller 53 31,9 40 24,1 Maize  [166] 
Self-Sufficient 78 47 87 52,5 
Net Buyer 31 19,6 30 19 
Net Seller 46 29,1 43 27,2 Sorghum [158] 
Self-sufficient 81 51,3 85 53,8 
Net Buyer 25 15,6 30 18,6 
Net Seller 33 20,5 38 23,6 
Mali 
Millet  
[161] 
Self-Sufficient 103 63,9 93 57,8 
[ ] : Total number of households producing the crop 
Table 1: Number and proportion of agricultural households per type according to both definitions  
 
Using the quantity definition drives to: 
- in the Mexican household survey: 
o under-estimate the net buyers (22,8% vs. 27,9%) 
o over-estimate the net sellers (75,8% vs. 70,6%) and let the proportion of self-
sufficient households unchanged 
- in the Malian survey: 
o under-estimate the net buyers (except for Sorghum) and the self-sufficient (except 
for millet) 
o over-estimate the number of net sellers (except for millet) 
So a first conclusion is that using one or the other definition has an influence on the typology’s 
structure, but that the estimation bias depends on the crop. Let’s remind the importance of the 
global proportion of the three household categories in a region (or a country). It gives the economist 
or the policy maker a good idea of the rural population sensibility to a political reform such as trade 
liberalization. In Table 2 we investigate, the movements of each household from one category to 
another under both definitions. 
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    Value Definition 
    Net Buyer Net Seller Self-Sufficient 
Net Buyer 47 2 0 
Net Seller 13 150 0 
Mexico 
(Teopisca, 
Chiapas) 
Maize 
[215] 
Self-Sufficient 0 0 3 
Net Buyer 34 0 1 
Net Seller 3 38 12 Maize  [166] 
Self-Sufficient 2 2 74 
Net Buyer 29 0 2 
Net Seller 2 31 13 Sorghum [158] 
Self-Sufficient 0 11 70 
Net Buyer 24 1 
[ ] : Total number of households producing the crop 
Table 2: Definition crossing and estimation bias of number of household per type 
For each crop, diagonal numbers are invariant households: they do not change of category 
while definition changes. Detailed results are: 
In the Mexican survey: 
- 8% of net sellers in quantity become net buyers in value 
- 4,1% of net buyers in quantity become net sellers in value. Thus we can suppose that cash 
constraint is binding harder for net buyer households (only a very few of them can speculate 
on prices). 
In the Malian survey: 
- 23,1% (resp. 28,3%; resp. 15%) of net sellers of maize (resp. sorghum; resp. millet) in 
quantity become self-sufficient in value: the associated household behaviour is quite 
difficult to understand. It is possible that these households sell part of their maize after 
harvest and dedicate the same amount of money (and even the same physical money) to buy 
more maize later. This case of “different sources of income allocated to different uses 
depending on their origin” has already been reported by Duflo (2003) and was named 
“mental accounts”. 
- 5,8% (resp. 4,3% ; resp. 15%) of maize (resp. sorghum ; resp. millet) net sellers in quantity 
are net buyers in value. 
- 13,6% of all self-sufficient in quantity become net sellers in value 
 
In both surveys and for each crop, most of net buyers in quantity stay net buyers in value. This 
is because most of the net buyers in quantity (consuming more than producing) usually do not sell, 
even if considering the higher prices incentive in post harvest periods: they consume what they 
produced and buy the rest of what they need on the market (which is coherent with the central 
assumption when considering the “quantity” definition). An important and interesting bias of 
category allocation is to classify a household as a net seller (in quantity) whereas it is a net buyer (in 
value). The reason of this fact could correspond to the “cash constraint – price seasonality” 
explanation we have already given in 3.2 : even if the household produce more that what it 
consumes, it is possible that it sells more than Q - X at low prices (because of urgent cash 
requirements) and has to buy later at higher prices.  
Our intuition is that the probability of committing an error when classifying households in the 
three categories increases as the mean of the price differential (Pb – Ps) increases and when the Q / 
X ratio is close to 1+. Suppose a small ε > 0 and a given (fixed) price differential: 
- if 0 < Q / X < 1- ε,  almost all households never sell, so they are net buyers according to 
both “quantity” and “value” definitions 
0 
Net Seller 5 23 
Quantity 
Definition 
Mali 
Millet  
[161] 
Self-Sufficient 1 14 
5 
88 
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- if Q / X ≈ 1+ which means 1 < Q / X < 1 + ε,  households are classified as net sellers in 
quantity but some of them could in fact be net buyers in value because of the cash constraint. 
Probability of classification mistake could be high. 
- if Q / X >> 1, even if households do buy the food crop they also sell, it is very unlikely that 
B will exceed S. 
We just showed that the global proportion of net buyer, net seller and self-sufficient agricultural 
households can vary according to the definition. This is important because knowing those relative 
proportions gives a first idea of the global welfare impact of a trade reform. If one expects price to 
decrease after the reform, it is useful to know whether the proportion of net seller households, 
which are the reform losers, is closer to 30% than to 40%. Knowing the proportion of real self-
sufficient households (Qs = Qb = 0 and not Q = X) can also be important because self-sufficient 
rural households are said to be insensible to reforms and prices changes. 
 
5.3) Comparing NBR formulas 
The question we ask now is: how does the use of one or another NBR formula affect the 
distributional welfare impact profile over the household income distribution? To investigate it, we 
have constructed four graphics to compare NBR expressions (0) and (10) for each crop. Both NBR 
formulas are displayed over the logarithm of total household income. Because we do not have 
enough points, we did not smooth (using kernel and bandwidth techniques) the data over the income 
profiles as it is the case in Deaton (1989, 1997): it enables us to see if there are real differences 
between both expressions. 
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Fig5: “Quantity” and “value” NBR comparisons 
 
Results with the NBR that integrates price seasonality (10) differ from the NBR expression 
(0) that does not integrate it every time the red line does not coincide with the black one (Fig. 5). 
Graphic for maize producers in Teopisca (Chiapas, Mexico) show very little discrepancies between 
both methods. This is because the majority of surveyed households produce much more than their 
annual consumption (Q/X >> 1 and so the “quantity” NBR > 0) and although price seasonality is 
locally very pronounced (see Fig3) the “value” NBR is also positive. Graphics for the three crops in 
Mali show a little more discrepancy between both methods. There is no clear evidence of a link 
between the differences between both NBR expressions and households’ income level. Yet, we 
observe an interesting point: in the upper half of the graphs (NBR>0 meaning that the household is 
a net seller), it seems that the “value” NBR is often inferior to the “quantity” NBR. This means that 
the calculated benefit of a price increase would be smaller. On the other hand, calculated welfare 
loss caused by a price increase would be exaggerated for the net buyers if using the (10) NBR, since 
black line is often inferior. 
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6) Conclusion 
To conclude we will insist on four points: 
1. Expressions (8) and (9), which define a net seller (resp. buyer) comparing the marketed values, 
seem to be the more relevant to classify agricultural households in categories than produced and 
consumed quantities. 
2. The new NBR formula we proposed permits to take into account market failures and 
agricultural price seasonality, by integrating every household’s market transactions (marketed 
quantities and related prices). Our reformulation follows the original idea of the NBR concept 
since it still represents the budget share of crop i for household h: 
])()()()([1 ∑∑ −=
t
aa
t
vv
h
i tQtPtQtPC
NBR  
3. As a first step of distributional impacts assessment of a trade reform affecting the price of a food 
crop, knowing the global proportion of net buyers, net sellers and self-sufficient (those who 
never sell nor buy and not those who produce the same quantity that they consume) is crucial. It 
gives to the policymaker and the economist a first idea of the overall effect of the reform. For 
example, if trade reform is supposed to increase food crop prices in a developing country 
(increases in world food crop prices are to be expected if developed countries agricultural 
policies are eliminated (Chabe-Ferret, 2003) or if some are used for ethanol for instance), under 
estimating the proportion of net buyers drives to under estimate the global rural population’s 
welfare lost. Our results showed little discrepancies between both “quantity” and “value” NBR 
so using one or another formula could not have strong consequences on the assessment of the 
distributional impacts. But this could be an effect of the few household data we have utilized 
(the Mexican and Malian survey accounts for no more than 215 households per crop whereas in 
Deaton (1989) more than 9000 household are treated for rice in Thailand).  
4. This leads us to make a practical recommendation for survey designers: if the applied use of this 
reformulated NBR could contribute to get more precise impacts assessments, it implies to 
collect more data while doing surveys, by recording every market transactions of each 
household (bought, sold quantities and related prices). This would enable to reflect market 
failures and seasonality of food crop prices, which are two constancies agricultural households 
have to face in developing countries.  
Finally, we would like to propose three directions for future research: 
1. In this paper we assumed that, consecutively to an agricultural trade reform, an exogenous 
change of border price is uniformly translated at every moment of the year by lowering or 
raising the price seasonality curves. But this is a strong hypothesis that lead us to ask two 
questions: what is the specific impact on (a) the regional differential between farm gate price 
and retail market price?, and (b) the regional price seasonality? 
2. Lederman and al. (2005) wrote about the “surprising resistance of mexican maize” in Mexico 
(price of maize sharply decreased since NAFTA4 but maize superficies rose). Léonard and 
Losch (2005) explained it by showing regional differentiations in agricultural productivity but 
our analysis could offer another explanation. Does the local price seasonality of maize, as we 
observed in Teopisca (Chiapas, Mexico), act as a buffer for net seller producers who can wait 
for higher prices to sell their harvest (coping with price decrease by delayed sales)? 
3. Lastly, at the frontier of a policy implication and a direction for future research, improving the 
storage capacity and reducing the cash constraint for targeted poor rural households, both by 
improving access to the credit market, could be accompanied by non negligible welfare gains. 
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ANNEXE 
 
The prices of I tradable goods are changing (we suppose an infinitesimal variation) because 
of a trade reform. We look for the income equivalent associated to the welfare change of household 
h, which is the exogenous amount of money to transfer or to quit to h, to restore its initial level of 
utility.  
We writeψ , the indirect utility function of h. We note F  the set of factors, P  the set of 
outputs with where is the set of produced but not consumed outputs, Psc the PcPscPsP ∪∪= Ps
set of both produced and consumed outputs and Pc the set of consumed but not produced goods by 
h. We note ψ =ψ );( pC  where  and PFp ∪∈ =C Total expenditures = Total Income. We do not 
consider here leisure time. Deaton (1997) assume that household h is separable, meaning that it 
faces perfect and complete set of markets an dit takes production and consumption decisions 
sequentially. We can write ψ =ψ ));(( ppb π+ where )( pπ is the agricultural profit function and 
b an exogenous transfer. Let’s note Qi output supply (Qi > 0) or input demand(Qi  < 0) and Xi  
household marshalian demand for i. 
According to Hotelling’s lemma : 
Qi = 
pi∂
∂π
 if FPscPsi ∪∪∈ , 0 if Pci ∈  
According to Roy’s identity: 
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Cpi
Xi ∂
∂
∂
∂−= ψψ if PscPci ∪∈ , 0 if FPsi ∪∈  
Equivalent income associated to the welfare change is found by totally diferenciating ψ , by setting 
( 0=ψd ) and using Hotelling’s lemma and Roy’s identity : 
0)(
0)(
=∂
∂−++∂
∂=
=∂
∂+∂
∂+∂
∂=∂
∂+∂
∂=
∑ ∑
∑∑
∈ ∈
∈∈
dpi
C
XiQidpidb
C
d
dpi
pi
dpi
pi
db
C
dp
p
dC
C
d
Ii Ii
IiIi
ψψψ
ψπψψψψ
 
We simplify by
C∂
∂ψ , resolve it for and we divide by C : db
pi
dpi
C
XiQipi
C
db
Ii
∑
∈
−=−  
Net Benefit Ratio for good I and household h is defined as : 
C
XiQipiRBNi −=        so     
pi
piiRBN
C
b
Ii
Δ=Δ− ∑
∈
 
We observe here that the NBR formula is close to the net buyer (resp. seller) « quantity » definition. 
Writing a first order Taylor approximation of ψ  we find : 
b
C
piXiQi
C Ii
Δ∂
∂−=Δ−∂
∂=Δ ∑
∈
ψψψ )( . 
First element of right hand is unobservable but we suppose it is positive for all households (the 
household’s utility increases with its income). The relation between the variation of the indirect 
utility function of household h and is thus shown, as well as the relation between NBRi and .  bΔ bΔ
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